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We present a dynamic microstructure model where a dealer market (DM) and a
crossing network (CN) interact. We consider sequentially arriving agents having
diﬀerent valuations for an asset. Agents maximize their proﬁts by either trad-
ing at a DM or by submitting an order for (possibly) uncertain execution at a
CN. We develop the analysis for three diﬀerent informational settings: trans-
parency, “complete” opaqueness of all order ﬂow, and “partial” opaqueness (with
observable DM trades). We ﬁnd that a CN and a DM cater for diﬀerent types
of traders. Investors with a high eagerness to trade are more likely to prefer a
DM. The introduction of a CN increases overall order ﬂow by attracting traders
who would not otherwise submit orders (“order creation”). It also diverts trades
from the DM. The transparency and “partial” opaqueness settings generate sys-
tematic patterns in order ﬂow. With transparency, the probability of observing
a CN order at the same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if
it was not. Buy (sell) orders at a CN are also less likely to attract subsequent
sell (buy) orders at the DM.
JEL Codes: G10, G20
Keywords: Dynamic Order Submission, Alternative Trading Systems, Dealer
Market, Crossing Network, Order Flow, Market Microstructure.1 Introduction
In today’s ﬁnancial markets securities are simultaneously traded on a diversity
of trading platforms. Diﬀerent trading systems therefore compete for order ﬂow.
A well-documented example is the competition between Electronic Communica-
tion Networks (ECNs) and the Nasdaq dealer market (see e.g. Huang (2002)).
A recent eye-catching combination concerns traditional continuous markets and
batch-type crossing networks (CNs). CNs are deﬁned by the SEC (1998) as “sys-
tems that allow participants to enter unpriced orders to buy and sell securities.
Orders are crossed at a speciﬁed time at a price derived from another market
(i.e. the continuous market)”. When faced with the choice among these trading
platforms, investors can opt for the continuous market or for the CN. Despite
the prevalence of CNs next to continuous markets, the dynamic aspects of the
coexistence of these systems have not been well explored yet.
In this paper we investigate the interaction of a CN and a continuous (one-
tick) dealer market (DM) by analyzing the impact on the composition and the
dynamics of the order ﬂow on both systems. We develop the analysis for three
diﬀerent informational settings: transparency, “complete” opaqueness, and “par-
tial” opaqueness. The benchmark transparency case reﬂects that traders are fully
informed about past order ﬂow and hence observe the prevailing state of the CN’s
order book before determining their order choice. In reality, however, CNs are
rather opaque. We incorporate this informational environment by analyzing two
diﬀerent degrees of opaqueness. When “partially” opaque, traders observe pre-
vious trades at the DM, while “complete” opaqueness implies that traders are
uninformed on both past CN and DM order ﬂow.
Our model adapts that of Parlour (1998). While she focuses on the choice
between limit and market orders on an auction market, we deal with the choice
between two trading venues. Traders are assumed to arrive randomly and se-
quentially. When both trading systems coexist, depending upon their valuations,
traders can obtain guaranteed execution in the DM, opt for cheaper but (pos-
sibly) uncertain execution on the CN, or refrain from trading. The transaction
price on a CN is typically determined on another market: in our case we take
the midprice of the DM.1 This implies that CNs do not actively contribute to
1This is in line with actual business practice: CNs cross at the mid-price derived from
another market (see e.g. websites ITG Posit and E-crossnet).
1price discovery. Order ﬂow to the CN is gathered in an order book where time
priority is assumed, i.e. orders arriving earlier receive priority in execution over
their successors on the same market side. The implication is that at the cross,
the last submitted orders at the excess market side do not obtain execution.
Common to the three informational settings, we do ﬁnd that an increase in
the DM’s relative spread augments the CN’s order ﬂow. In general, a CN and a
DM cater to diﬀerent types of traders. Investors with a low patience to trade are
more likely to trade at a DM. The existence of a CN results in “order creation”:
investors with a high patience to trade submit orders to a CN whereas they would
never trade at a DM. The transparency and “partial” opaqueness settings also
generate systematic patterns in order ﬂow, a result reminiscent of Parlour (1998).
These theoretical insights all point at time-varying order ﬂow at a CN and trade
ﬂow at a DM. Our results therefore highlight that it is important to take into
account the interaction between trading systems when measuring “normal” order
ﬂow. For example, when looking at an individual trading system, some order or
trade ﬂow sequences could wrongly be interpreted as being driven by information
events, whereas they are actually caused by the interaction of trading systems.
Our paper is closely related to two recent strands of research. First, a number
of papers have developed dynamic microstructure models for an auction mar-
ket.2 Parlour (1998) looks at the price dynamics in a one-tick limit order market.
She shows that, even in the absence of informed trading, systematic patterns in
transaction prices result because traders condition their behavior on the state
of the limit order book and on their expectations for future traders’ behavior.3
Foucault (1999) also investigates the choice between market and limit orders and
focuses on the latter orders’ risk of non-execution and the winner’s curse prob-
lem. He derives empirical predictions on the cross-sectional behavior of the mix
between market and limit orders. Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2004) model a
dynamic limit order market as a stochastic sequential game and demonstrate or-
der ﬂow persistence, even in the absence of changes in the consensus value of
the asset. Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2003) endogenize the auction market’s
spread (the number of ticks) and study the resiliency of the limit order book
2Note that static equilibrium models of the limit order book are much more common. Ex-
amples include Glosten (1994), Chakravarty and Holden (1995), Rock (1996) and Seppi (1997).
3Thus, a trader explicitly takes into account how her current order aﬀects the future traders’
choice to submit market or limit orders.
2when introducing heterogeneity in traders’ patience. In their model, however,
arriving limit order traders are required to undercut existing quotes. Rosu (2004)
relaxes this assumption as he considers a continuous time version of the latter
model with endogenous undercutting. In contrast to the previous models, he also
allows for strategic cancellation of limit orders. Our paper contributes to this line
of research as we consider a dynamic microstructure model to study (partly, at
least) endogenous liquidity supply by looking at the competition between two
diﬀerent trading venues. This is in contrast to the previously mentioned papers
that restrict themselves to only one market, i.e. an auction market.
A second line of recent work applies static models to analyze the competition
between a CN and a DM.4 Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) start from a model
where traders simultaneously decide to submit orders to one of both markets.
They ﬁnd that a CN is characterized by two externalities: a positive (liquidity)
externality, as an increase in the CN’s trading volume beneﬁts all traders, and a
negative (crowding) externality, as low-liquidity preference traders compete with
higher liquidity preference traders on the same side of the market. Expanding
on this paper, Dönges and Heineman (2001) focus on some game theoretic re-
ﬁnements to reduce the multiplicity of equilibria in the coordination game. We
contribute to this line of recent work as we explicitly introduce dynamics into the
analysis. These dynamics are important: a typical characteristic of a CN is that
it “matches” orders at a speciﬁed time during the trading day, while the other
market simultaneously operates in a continuous fashion. In particular, traders
arrive sequentially and both the state of the CN’s order book (when transparent)
and their expectation on the behavior of future traders until the cross determine
their submission strategy.
There is by now a substantial amount of empirical papers analyzing the in-
teraction between trading systems (for an overview see Biais, Glosten and Spatt
(2002)). The number of papers empirically investigating the impact of a CN
on other trading systems, however, is rather limited. Gresse (2002) studies the
4This strand of research is part of a comprehensive literature on the
competition between trading systems. Examples include Glosten (1998),
Foucault and Parlour (2001), Shy and Tarkka (2001), Santos and Scheinkman (2001),
Di Noia (2001), Viswanathan and Wang (2002), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2003) and
Parlour and Seppi (2003).
3impact of the POSIT CN on the DM segment of the London Stock Exchange.
She ﬁnds that POSIT has a share of total trading volume of about one to two
percent in these stocks, but that its probability of execution is still low (2-4%).
Moreover, she reports that activity at POSIT does not have a detrimental eﬀect
on the liquidity at the considered DM. Næs and Ødegaard (2004) focus on trades
of the Norwegian Government Petroleum fund. In a study of 4200 orders that are
ﬁrst sent to a CN and then, in case of non-execution, to brokers, they ﬁnd that
execution costs of crossed trades are lower. Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003)
use proprietary data of 59 institutional investors in the US who choose between
trading platforms. They ﬁnd that realized execution costs are generally lower on
alternative trading systems (including CNs). Fong, Madhavan and Swang (2004)
focus on the impact of block trades on diﬀerent trading venues, i.e. a limit order
book, a CN and an upstairs market. They ﬁnd that competition from the two
latter markets imposes no adverse eﬀect on the liquidity of the limit order book.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the trans-
parency benchmark model. Section 3 provides an analysis of its equilibrium.
We ﬁrst deal with the markets in isolation, next we study their interaction. In
Section 4, we implement two degrees of opaqueness, i.e. partial and complete
opaqueness. Section 5 oﬀers a discussion of a number of possible extensions to
our model. Finally, Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.
2 Setup of the Model
The model we develop is based on the setup in Parlour (1998). While her model
discusses the traders’ choice between market and limit orders in a continuous
order driven market, we adapt it to analyze competition between two trading
systems. In our economy, there are two days. Agents decide upon consumption
on day 1 and day 2, denoted by C1 and C2. Agents are risk neutral and diﬀer
with respect to their preferences over consumption on these two days. These
preferences are given by the following utility function:
U (C1,C2;β) = C1 + βC2
with β the subjective preference or type of the agent. Next to these two “goods”
C1 and C2, an asset exists that on day 2 pays out V units of C2 per share.
4As we are investigating the short-term interactions between both markets, the
assumption of no uncertainty in V is a reasonable starting point.5 During the
ﬁrst day, the trading day, claims to the asset can be exchanged for C1. Prices in
the market are exchange ratios C1/C2. Agents can then construct their preferred
consumption path by trading claims to this asset. The trading day consists of T
periods, indexed by t = 1,...,T. Each period exactly one agent (also referred to as
trader) arrives in the market, and each agent arrives at most once. The arriving
agent at time t is characterized by two elements. First, her initial endowments
determine her trading orientation. With probability πB, she is a buyer and has
one unit of the asset she can buy in exchange for C1, which we denote by 1. With
probability πS = 1−πB, she is a seller and has one unit of the asset she can sell,
−1. Secondly, the agent has a type βt, which is drawn from an i.i.d. continuous
distribution F (.) with support
￿
β,   β
￿
, where we assume 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 ≤   β. This βt
captures the trader’s personal trade-oﬀ between current and future consumption
in the utility function above. In this way, it also determines her degree of patience
for trade. In particular, if the trader is a buyer, she will be more eager to buy
if she has a high beta than if her beta is low. A seller on the other hand, will
be more eager to sell if she has a low β. In order to see this, assume that the
arriving trader is a buyer. Buying the asset yields βtV . She compares this value
with the price in the market and performs the buy if the price is lower than the
value she attaches to the asset. If βt is high, and she thus attaches more weight to
consumption on the second day, she will be more eager to trade than if βt is low.
The reasoning is that the trading gains are higher in the former case. Similarly,
a seller with a low beta will be more eager to sell since she prefers consumption
on the ﬁrst day.
Traders can choose between submitting an order to a dealer market (DM),
to a crossing network (CN), or not to submit an order. Competition between
dealers on the DM is suﬃciently harsh such that the spread is one tick, that is
A − B = 1, with B the bid price and A the ask price. This assumption is as in
Parlour (1998). The implication is that buyers can always buy at a price A, the
price at which a dealer is willing to sell. Sellers looking for immediacy in the
dealer market obtain B.
Next to a DM, we also introduce a CN. We assume that the matching of
5For example, POSIT organizes up to 15 daily “crosses” for each stock. In Section 5, we
will discuss uncertainty in V .
5orders (the “cross”) takes place at the end of the trading day, hence after period
T (we mean after the action of the agent arriving in period T). The price of
the cross is derived from the bid and ask in the dealer market and equals the
midquote (A + B)/2. Given our assumptions, executed orders at the CN face no








t > 0 (cs
t < 0) represents the cumulative amount of buy
(sell) orders at the CN before the order at time t.7 After the action of the trader


























trader t submits no order to CN
.
The ﬁrst two evolutions describe a buy and sell order, respectively. The last
case, where the CN’s order book remains unchanged, stems from a trade at a
dealer or not trading at all. Once submitted, orders cannot be modiﬁed or can-
celled. This means that orders remain in the CN’s order book until the cross.8
Order execution is determined by the imbalance between the queue of buy orders
and the queue of sell orders. If cb
T = |cs
T|, meaning no imbalance, then all orders
are executed. If cb
T < |cs
T|, some sell orders cannot be executed. We assume time
priority such that the ﬁrst cb




T| buy orders are executed. It goes without saying that time priority
inﬂuences the order submission strategies of the traders. Trading at the “DM
as last resort” upon non-execution at the CN is not a possible strategy: such
“opportunistic trading” is assumed to be suﬃciently costly.9 Furthermore, we
6As Section 5 shows, introducing uncertainty in V will alter this.
7The assumption that there is only one cross during the trading day is not restrictive.
Suppose that there would be multiple crosses during the trading day, i.e. crosses at time
0 < T1 < T2 < ... < T. If unﬁlled orders remain in the CN-book after an intermediate cross,
the results of our model do not change. Since there is no waiting cost within the trading day
(β applies between trading days), a trader is indiﬀerent about at which cross precisely her
order executes. Hence, what is relevant to a trader is the probability of execution until the
last cross at time T. This means that the trader solves exactly the exact same model as we
describe. If unﬁlled orders would not remain in the book after intermediate crosses, our model
then captures the period from one cross to another. In that case, what is relevant to a trader,
is the time until the next cross and the state of the book at the time she arrives. So, our model
can be applied ﬁrst to the period [0,T1], then to (T1,T2] and so on.
8This is in contrast with a limit order market where stored limit orders disappear when they
are hit by a market order.
9A CN order is a free option when trading at the “DM as last resort” implies no addtional
6need to distinguish the case where the order book is transparent versus opaque.
Section 3 discusses the case where the CN’s order book is fully transparent. Arriv-
ing traders at t are able to observe both queues and base their order submission
strategy on the resulting order imbalance. Herein lies one of the major diﬀerences
with the limit order market model of Parlour (1998). In her model, the trader
looks at both sides of the queue because the other side inﬂuences the decision
of a potential counterparty. In our model with full transparency, only the order
imbalance at the CN will determine the order submission strategies, not their
individual length. In Section 4, we introduce diﬀerent degrees of opaqueness.
3 Equilibrium under Transparency
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium order submission strategies when
the CN’s order book is fully transparent. As a ﬁrst step, we consider successively a
DM and a CN in isolation. This approach allows to gain intuition about the model
and the structure and functioning of each market. Subsequently, we determine
the equilibrium when both markets coexist. The methodology is identical in all
cases. We calculate for a trader arriving at time t a cutoﬀ βt at which she is
indiﬀerent between two actions, taking execution probabilities as given.
3.1 Dealer Market in Isolation
Suppose for now that there only exists a DM. In this case, a trader can choose
between submitting an order to the DM or not to trade at all. She will submit an
order to the dealer (DM order) as long as this yields a positive proﬁt, otherwise
she prefers not to trade. When the proﬁt is zero, she is indiﬀerent. Before
deciding, she observes the bid and ask in the market, and her βt. The proﬁt of a
buy order to the dealer is the diﬀerence between the valuation of the trader βtV
and the price paid, which is the ask, i.e. the proﬁt is βtV − A. Similarly, for a
sell order, the proﬁt is B − βtV . From these proﬁts, the cutoﬀ values for βt are













where the ﬁrst superscript refers to buy (b) or sell (s), and the second to
DM. The interpretation is as follows. A buyer arriving at time t who has a βt
higher than A/V will submit a DM buy order, all others will not. When the
trader at time t is a seller, she will submit a DM sell order if her βt is smaller
than B/V . The order submission strategies are depicted in Figure 1. Note that
traders having a βt between B/V and A/V will never submit an order, regardless







No Buy Order  DM Buy 
DM Sell  No Sell Order 
Figure 1: Order Submission Strategies with Dealer Market in Isolation
3.2 Crossing Network in Isolation
In this subsection, only a crossing network exists (and no dealer market). To
compare the diﬀerent settings, we assume that the price at which a cross will
take place is the midquote as if a dealer market would exist: (A + B)/2. When
arriving at time t, a trader also observes her βt and the state of the CN’s order
book. A trader will submit a CN order as long as this results in a positive expected
proﬁt. We need to consider expected proﬁts, since in contrast with an order to a
8DM, the execution of a CN order may not be certain. If the order executes, the
proﬁt for the trader is the diﬀerence between the trader’s valuation and the price
paid (the midquote). When taking into account the uncertainty about execution,
the expected proﬁt of a CN buy order is pb
t (βtV − (A + B)/2), where pb
t denotes
the expected probability of execution of a CN buy order submitted at time t.
For a CN sell order, the expected proﬁt is ps
t ((A + B)/2 − βtV ), with ps
t the
probability of execution of a sell order submitted at time t. These probabilities
depend on the state of the book in the CN, and the time left until the end of the
trading day: pb
t (ct,T − t) and ps
t (ct,T − t), but for notational convenience we
suppress this dependence. The reasoning for this dependence is that if a trader
joins the longer queue, enough future orders need to be submitted to the shorter
side of the CN’s order book to obtain execution. This is more likely earlier in
the trading day, when there are still a lot of periods to come. Finally, when the
expected proﬁt of a CN order is negative, the trader chooses to abstain, leaving
her zero proﬁts.
A trader’s strategy whether or not to submit a CN order is determined by the
expected proﬁts of this action. Solving for βt, we ﬁnd the following cutoﬀ value














In words, a trader arriving at t will submit a CN buy (sell) order if her β is








. To be complete, these cutoﬀ values hold
if the execution probability is strictly positive. If it is zero, a trader is always
indiﬀerent between a CN order and no order, since both yield zero proﬁt. If this
occurs, we assume that traders prefer to abstain. The order submission strategies
are summarized in Figure 2. Note that in contrast with a DM in isolation, there
is no “gap”, i.e. there is no range of betas where neither a buyer nor a seller
submits an order. The reasoning is that a CN has no spread whereas a DM is







No Buy Order  CN Buy 
No Sell Order  CN Sell 
Figure 2: Order Submission Strategies with a CN in Isolation
3.3 Interaction between CN and DM
After having discussed the two trading systems in isolation, we now turn to the
full model and characterize the choice problem faced by a trader arriving in the
market at time t. She can choose between submitting an order to the DM, the
CN, or no trade at all. Upon her arrival, she knows whether she is a buyer or a
seller, observes the bid and ask price of the dealer, the state of the CN’s order
book ct and her βt. Recall that the CN crosses at the midprice of the dealer’s bid
and ask. Moreover, she knows the time remaining to the cross, the distribution
of buyers and sellers and their willingness to trade. Based on this information,
she chooses between three possible actions. First, she can initiate a trade at the
dealer. Such an order has a guaranteed immediate execution. Secondly, she can
opt for submitting an order to the CN. This would yield a better price as it allows
the trader to save the half-spread, which in our model is equal to half a tick. With
this order, however, she might face the risk of non-execution. Execution is certain
when upon arrival she is able to join the shorter queue (due to time priority in
the CN). In all other cases, the execution probability is lower than one. Thirdly,
she can refrain from trading when it yields a negative (expected) proﬁt.
Denote the strategy of a buyer arriving at time t by φ
b
t (ct,βt) and of a seller
by φ
s
t (ct,βt) where the notation stresses that the strategy depends on the state
of the CN’s order book at time t, ct and the trader’s type βt. Important to note
is that these strategies depend on time; in other words, they are nonstationary.
10Most relevant is the number of periods left until T, the end of the trading day.
The setup of this model can be seen as a stochastic sequential game. Moreover,
due to the recursive nature of the game, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist
and this equilibrium is unique (since traders are indiﬀerent between choices with
zero probability).
We apply the approach introduced above to solve the trader’s choice problem.
Thus we again determine cutoﬀ values for βt, i.e. levels of indiﬀerence between
diﬀerent actions for given execution probabilities. A ﬁrst cutoﬀ value represents
indiﬀerence between a trade in the DM and a CN order, a second between a CN
order and no order. As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 1, no other







as the value βt of a buyer that






























as the β at which a trader is indiﬀerent between a CN buy order




















t) is the βt of a seller that is indiﬀerent between a CN order and
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Furthermore, denote a buy at the DM by “1DM” (which transacts at the ask),
and a sell at the DM by “−1DM” (transacting at the bid). Similarly, “1CN” and
“−1CN” stand for a buy and sell order to the CN respectively. Proposition 1 then
states the equilibrium strategies of a trader arriving at t.











































t (ct,βt) = 1DM (buy at DM)
.






























t (ct,βt) = 0 (no order)
.
Proof. See Appendix A
The equilibrium order submission strategies are summarized in Figure 3.
Comparing this graph with Figures 1 and 2, there are some notable diﬀerences.
The most important one is that the cutoﬀ values are dynamic and change every
period t. For the markets in isolation, this was not the case. Moreover, although
the range of β’s at which no buy or sell order is submitted is the same, the ranges
at which DM and CN orders are submitted, are in general diﬀerent from the iso-
lation cases. Compared to the DM in isolation, there is order creation: traders
with intermediate β’s now submit orders to the CN which allows them to avoid
paying the half-spread. The CN also introduces competition for the DM as it
may divert trades away from the DM. Remark that this could lead to overall
trade creation but also to overall trade reduction. The reasoning for this poten-
tial trade reduction is that some of the investors choosing to trade at the DM if
in isolation may now opt for the CN at which their order may not execute.
Next, we derive some properties of this equilibrium. Lemma 1 shows that for
higher execution probabilities, the range of β’s of traders who submit a CN order
becomes wider, and complementary, the range of trader types who opt for an
order to the dealer becomes smaller. In other words, if the execution probability




















No Buy Order  CN Buy  DM Buy 
No Sell Order  CN Sell  DM Sell 
Figure 3: Order Submission Strategies with Dealer Market and Crossing
Network
Lemma 1 The higher the probability of execution on the CN, the more trader



















A crucial element in the choice between a CN order and a DM trade is the
execution probability at the CN, since this determines expected proﬁts. When
trader t submits a CN order, she changes the imbalance in the CN. This aﬀects
the execution probabilities of future CN orders and hence also the strategies
chosen by future traders. When determining her optimal strategy, trader t must
take these eﬀects of her order into account. Proposition 2 shows how the length
of the queues (and the imbalance) inﬂuences execution probabilities.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, at any time t, if the CN’s order book at the buy
side is one unit thicker, then the probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will
be lower (higher). If the CN’s order book at the sell side is one unit thicker, then
the probability of execution of a buy (sell) order will be higher (lower). If the book
13is one unit thicker at the buy side and one unit thicker at the sell side, then the


















































































































































































(both formulations, in terms of probabilities and in terms of betas, are equivalent).
Proof. See Appendix A
Intuitively, Proposition 2 argues that when the queue at one side of the market
is longer when a trader arrives on that side of the market, the execution probabil-
ities of a CN order are lower relative to when the queue is shorter (parts (i), (iv),
and by symmetry (ii) and (iv)). That is, traders face intertemporal competition
with traders of their own type. The reasoning is as follows. Suppose that a buyer
arrives at time τ and cb
τ ≥ |cs
τ|.10 Then if the book is one unit thicker at the
buy side, an additional CN order at the sell side must arrive in order to obtain
execution. This lowers the execution probability compared to the case when the
buy queue is one unit shorter (meaning also a smaller imbalance). Only when
both queues are one unit thicker (parts (iii) and (vi)), execution probabilities are
not aﬀected since the imbalance remains the same. This is in contrast with an
auction market as in Parlour (1998). In such a market, execution probabilities
are inﬂuenced when both queues become one unit longer. This proves that in a
CN the imbalance between both queues matters, while in a limit order market
the individual length of both queues is relevant.
3.4 Empirical Predictions on Order Flow Dynamics
Having determined and characterized the equilibrium order submission strategies
of traders, we now investigate whether systematic patterns can be predicted in
10If cb
τ −1 < |cs














14transaction and order ﬂow data. Parlour (1998) shows that this is the case in
the context of an auction market with limit and market orders. The reasoning
in her model is that the presence of the limit order book and the length of the
queues create a relation between past and current order ﬂow. In our model, the
relation between past and current order ﬂow is driven by the order imbalance in
the CN’s order book and not the length of the buy and sell orders in that order
book. This means that the dynamics of the market might (and will, as we shall
see) diﬀer in our model from those of Parlour (1998). The systematic patterns in
order ﬂow are analyzed in four propositions. In all cases, we start from a given
state of the book in the CN, ct, and from a speciﬁc order, a DM order in the two
ﬁrst propositions and a CN order in the two latter, and investigate the eﬀect on
the order ﬂow to the DM and the CN in the subsequent period.
Thus, we ﬁrst assume that the previous order (at time t) was a DM trade and
investigate the patterns in subsequent order submissions. Suppose the trader at
time t+1 is a buyer. Proposition 3 then states that the probability of observing
a DM buy does not hinge on whether the previous transaction was a DM buy or
a DM sell.
Proposition 3 The probability of a DM buy at time t + 1 is independent of






























A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. Contained in the discussion below.
A similar result holds for CN orders following a DM order. Proposition 4
shows that the probability that the current order is a CN order (buy or sell
depending on the trader that arrives) is independent of whether the previous
order was a DM sell or a DM buy.
15Proposition 4 The probability of a CN buy order at time t+1 is equal, whether






























A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. Contained in the discussion below.
The results in Propositions 3 and 4 are driven by the same intuition. Recall
that a trader chooses between submitting to the DM or the CN (or not trading)
on the basis of three elements: her impatience as given by βt, the state of the
CN’s order book, and the time left until the end of the trading day. The lat-
ter two factors determine the probability of execution of a CN order and hence
the expected proﬁt from choosing that strategy. If the previous order is a DM
trade, none of these three elements is inﬂuenced, hence it is irrelevant whether
the order is a DM buy or a DM sell. These results are in sharp contrast with
Parlour (1998). In her model, market orders do inﬂuence the probabilities of sub-
sequent orders as they change the depth in the limit order book and hence the
execution probabilities of subsequent limit orders.
However, the conclusions alter when we assume that the order at time t was
a CN order instead of a DM order. In this case, we obtain systematic patterns in
order ﬂow despite the fact that buyers and sellers arrive randomly. Proposition 5
shows that when the trader at time t has chosen a CN buy order, it is less likely
that a buyer at t+1 will do the same, compared to when trader t did not submit
a CN buy order.
Proposition 5 The probability of a CN buy order at time t+1 is smaller if the
order at time t was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This
in turn is smaller than the probability of observing a CN buy order, conditional
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16A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See Appendix A
Complementary to Proposition 5, Proposition 6 shows that it becomes more
likely that the current buyer submits a DM buy, if the previous order was a CN
buy order, compared to if it was another type of order.
Proposition 6 The probability of a DM buy at time t + 1 is larger if the order
at time t was a CN buy order than if it was a DM trade (buy or sell). This in
turn is larger than the probability of observing a DM buy, conditional upon the
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A symmetric result holds for the other side of the market.
Proof. See Appendix A
The intuition behind both propositions is as follows. Assume that the time
t + 1 trader is a buyer. If the queue of buy orders at time t + 1 is shorter
than the sell queue, the equality sign applies, since the execution probability of
a submitted CN buy order is one. In this case, the type of the previous order is
irrelevant for the current order ﬂow. In contrast, if after the order of the trader
at t the buy queue is longer than the sell queue, i.e. when there is an imbalance,
the type of the previous order does matter. Given her βt+1, the current trader
will be more likely to submit a CN buy order if the previous order increased the
execution probability. This is the case when the imbalance in the CN’s order
book decreased, which happens after a CN sell order in the previous period. A
DM trade (be it buy or sell) does not alter the imbalance, while a CN buy order
at t increases the imbalance. Symmetrically, if trader t+1 is less likely to submit
a CN order, she will be more likely to opt for an order to the dealer.
It is worth stressing again that although the patterns outlined in Propositions
5 and 6 are similar to the case of a limit order market in Parlour (1998), the
17underlying dynamics are very diﬀerent. In the case of a limit order market, the
length of the queues at bid and ask are important and both market and limit
orders have an eﬀect. In our model, with a DM and a CN, it is the imbalance
between buy and sell queues in the CN that is relevant, and this imbalance is
inﬂuenced only by CN orders, not by DM orders.
4 Equilibrium under Opaqueness
With transparency, traders condition their strategies on an information set con-
taining general information on the distribution of β, their individual βt, the time
left until the cross, traders’ distributions at both market sides, past order ﬂow
and the resulting CN’s order imbalance. As argued in the introduction, however,
most CNs are rather opaque. For example, CNs do not actively disseminate in-
formation on the state of their order book. The implication of opaqueness is that
traders are unable to base their strategies on the current imbalance in the CN’s
order book. In this section, we adapt our model to capture opaqueness. We deal
with two diﬀerent degrees of opaqueness: “complete” and “partial”. “Partial”
opaqueness implies that traders do observe previous DM trades but do not have
information on past order ﬂow to the CN. Therefore they can only partially in-
fer the current state of the CN’s order book. “Complete” opaqueness refers to
the case where traders also do not observe past DM trades. Introducing opaque-
ness renders our analysis more complicated. For tractability, we will restrict the
trading stage to contain two periods. We also develop a two-period model for
the benchmark transparency case to compare the opaqueness results with those
of transparency. To conclude we will illustrate and contrast the various infor-
mational settings, and brieﬂy discuss the reasoning and intuition for the more
general T-period case.
4.1 Analysis of the Two-Period Model
The determination of the equilibrium proceeds along the same lines as before.
For each informational setting, four cutoﬀ beta values (for t = 1,2) characterizing
traders indiﬀerent between two strategies are relevant: β
b
t,   β
b





value at which indiﬀerence between no order and a CN buy order holds at t, β
b
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Similarly, the buyer’s cutoﬀ value between trading on a DM or submitting a CN









































Hence, as before, to determine their choice between a CN or a DM, arriving
traders need to calculate the appropriate execution probability when submitting
their order to the CN. For the transparency case, this was the probability that
enough counterparty traders would arrive before the time of the cross to oﬀset the
created order imbalance. For the opaqueness cases, traders have no information
at all on past CN order ﬂow, and the resulting state of the CN’s order book.
Traders will now have to make predictions on the created imbalance, while also
accounting for the behavior of future traders.
From the above, it is clear that when the respective execution probabilities
are strictly positive, in each period it holds that:
β
b
























t for t = 1,2,
11As before, pb
t is the execution probability of a buy order submitted at time t.
19are the solutions to the following system of four equations:
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The ﬁrst two equations represent the indiﬀerence equations for traders arriving
in period 1 at both market sides. The last two equations oﬀer the same for
period 2. As argued before, the solution to this set of equations will depend on
the assumptions on the degree of transparency of the CN’s order book. In the
next subsection, we ﬁrst determine the solution for the benchmark transparency
case. Afterwards we turn to the complete and to the partial opaqueness cases,
respectively. For all cases we assume that the starting order imbalance in the
CN’s order book is zero.
4.2 Equilibrium
4.2.1 Transparency
In case of transparency the CN’s order book is fully observable, as in Section
3. Solving (1) for this two-period example requires the determination of all four
relevant execution probabilities. First of all, we present the case of a CN buy
order submitted in period 1. For this order to be executed, the trader arriving
in the ﬁnal period 2 must be a seller who submits a CN sell order. The range






Hence, no sellers will engage in DM trading in period 2. All sellers with a positive
value to trading will submit their order to the CN as this system now guarantees
certainty of execution due to the created order imbalance (see also Figure 3 for



































Buyers and sellers arriving in period 2 observe the order book imbalance and










1 if c2 = 1
0 otherwise
.










2,t. Clearly, these are now “path dependent” as they hinge on the observed
CN’s order book imbalance. In other words, with transparency, the cutoﬀ betas
of traders depend on the state of the book at that time and can only be computed
once all previous traders have chosen their strategy (i.e. in period 2).
Our two-period analysis for transparency shows that either all period 2 traders
go to the DM or all go to the CN (when submitting an order). In contrast, a
range of traders in period 1 will opt to go to the DM, whereas a complementary
range will opt for the CN.
4.2.2 Complete Opaqueness
Complete opaqueness implies that traders cannot observe the state of the CN’s
order book, as well as previous order ﬂow to both the DM and the CN. We start
our two-period analysis by determining the execution probability of a CN buy
order submitted in period 1. To obtain execution of this order, the trader arriving
in the ﬁnal period 2 must be a seller who submits a CN sell order. The range of



























21Similarly, a CN sell order in period 1 is executed if the trader in period 2 is a


























In a similar fashion, we derive the execution probabilities for the trader arriving at
time 2. Buyers in period 2 account for the possibility that the trader that arrived




















Similarly, the execution probability of a CN sell order in the second period is equal




















Substituting these expressions for pb
t,o and ps
t,o for both periods (t = 1,2) into
the system of indiﬀerence equations (1) renders a (nonlinear) system of four equa-












. These equations allow us to
determine the cutoﬀ beta values and hence traders’ order submission decisions for
both periods. Important to note is that due to the complete opaqueness assump-
tion, all cutoﬀ betas become independent from the actual order decisions as these
are unobserved, and hence from past types and orientations of traders. Therefore,
each arriving trader decides using her individual β and general predictions on past
and future traders’ behavior and the resulting expected CN order book. The re-
sult is that, in contrast to the transparency case, any form of path-dependency
is absent.
4.2.3 Partial Opaqueness
With partial opaqueness, traders observe past DM trades. This implies that
traders condition their choice between CN, DM, or no order on their individ-
ual β, as well as on whether DM trades have been observed. In our two-period
22framework, this implies that trader 2’s information set becomes larger as com-
pared to the complete opaqueness case. For the ﬁrst period, she either observes
a DM trade, or she does not observe any order at all. In the former case, she
knows that the book is still empty and that the execution probability of any CN
order is zero. When not observing a ﬁrst-period DM trade, she knows the ﬁrst
trader submitted a CN buy or sell order, or no order. This implies that she is
able to compute execution probabilities more precisely ruling out the possibility
of a DM trade. Trader 1 now takes into account the impact her choice has on the
subsequent trader’s information set.
Again, our goal is to derive explicit equations for the execution probabilities
under this assumption, which in turn could be substituted in (1) to determine












. As for the complete opaqueness




































Note that although the equations are the same as for complete opaqueness,
the probabilities will be diﬀerent as the cutoﬀ betas reﬂect trader 2’s behavior.
Assume that trader 2 is a buyer, and that she does not observe a DM trade in the
previous period. Then, her execution probability equals the probability that the
previous trader has submitted a CN sell order, conditional upon the information
that no DM trade is observed. However, if she had observed a DM trade in period
1, she would know that the CN book is currently empty and that the execution




0 if DM trade at 1 is observed






0 if DM trade at 1 is observed
p(CN buy at 1|no DM order at 1) otherwise
23where “no DM order at 1” refers to not observing any DM order in period 1.
Using Bayes’ rule, we ﬁnd that:
p(CN sell at 1|no DM order at 1)
=
p(no DM order at 1|CN sell at 1)p(CN sell at 1)
p(no DM order at 1)
.
We now turn to the computation of each of these probabilities. Trivially, it
holds that:
p(no DM order at 1|CN sell at 1) = 1.
The unconditional probability of a CN sell order occurring at 1 is:























). Finally, the unconditional probability that no DM order
occurs at 1 equals:



















which equals the complement of the DM order segment on both market sides.
Hence, both execution probabilities for traders arriving in period 2 can be
obtained. Substituting both periods’ execution probabilities in system (1) results
in four (nonlinear) equations in four unknowns. Solving this system again renders
the necessary cutoﬀ values to determine both traders’ order submission strategies.
In contrast to the complete opaqueness case, however, now these values are path
dependent, which is a result similar to the transparency outcome. In the next
subsection, we provide simulations which allow us to compare the three diﬀerent
informational settings.
4.3 Illustration and Comparison
In this section, we illustrate the implications of the diﬀerences in informational
settings. More speciﬁcally, we look at the diﬀerences in order ﬂow and cutoﬀ
betas for transparency, complete opaqueness and partial opaqueness in a two-
24period setting. To this end, we parameterize our model by making assumptions
on bid and ask prices, as well as on the continuous distribution F (.) with support
￿
β,   β
￿
.
For our illustration, we set the bid B = 10 and the ask A = 11, such that we
have a one-tick market. The level of the bid and ask price determines the relative
value of the half spread, which is the amount a trader potentially saves if she
submits an order to the CN instead of the DM. The execution price P on the CN
is the midprice from the DM, 0.5(A + B) = 10.5. We also set V equal to this
midprice. We assume 2 periods in the trading day and an empty CN’s order book
at the beginning of the trading day. A trader is characterized by whether she is
a buyer or a seller, which happens with equal probability, hence πb = πs = 0.5.
To obtain closed form solutions for our system of indiﬀerence equations (1) we
impose a uniform distribution for βt with support
￿
β,   β
￿
= [0.7,1.3]. Finally,
we generate 100 000 paths of two sequentially arriving traders by drawing their
orientation and type from the above mentioned distributions. Using our model,
we then determine their optimal strategies for the three informational settings.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of this simulation, averaged across all sim-
ulated paths. Table 1 presents the cumulative order ﬂow to the DM and to the
CN for both periods 1 and 2. In other words, the numbers in the rows for the
second period 2 are the sum of order ﬂow in both periods. Important to note as
well is that the numbers report order ﬂow, not actual trades. Table 2 shows the
average cutoﬀ betas of the traders in both periods.
The results in both tables show that transparency produces most order ﬂow
to the CN in the ﬁrst period. The reasoning is that ﬁrst-period traders anticipate
that their CN order will be observed by second-period traders, making a CN order
relatively more attractive than a DM trade. Lower transparency, i.e. complete
and partial opaqueness, induces ﬁrst period traders to select a DM more often.
Second period order ﬂow, however, shows opposite results. With transparency,
second period orders are only submitted to the CN when an opportunity exists.
Otherwise traders go to the DM or do not trade at all. With complete opaqueness,
traders do not observe the exact situation of the CN’s order book. This implies
that they may submit an order to the CN whereas ex-post the CN’s order book
may have been empty or unfavorable. This is reﬂected in the fact that second
period order ﬂow to the CN is highest for the complete opaqueness case. The
25cumulative order ﬂow to both CN and DM is highest with complete opaqueness.
This result stems from two forces. First, complete opaqueness implies that the
CN receives orders that would not occur with transparency or partial opaqueness,
as it would be clear that these orders are unsuccessful. Second, the DM is more
competitive with complete opaqueness as traders anticipate a CN order is less
likely to be hit in the second period.
Partial relative to complete opaqueness results in slightly more order ﬂow to
the CN in the ﬁrst period. This result follows from traders anticipating that a
CN order now attracts more CN orders in the second period. The cumulative
order ﬂow to the CN, however, is lower. Observed ﬁrst-period DM trades result
in no second-period CN orders.
Table 1: Order Flow
Note: This table presents the cumulative order ﬂow resulting from
the illustration of the model.
DM CN
Sell Buy Sell Buy
Transparency
1 −0.22632 0.22648 −0.02286 0.02264
2 −0.45726 0.45908 −0.02549 0.02521
Complete opaqueness
1 −0.23073 0.23164 −0.01845 0.01748
2 −0.46325 0.46545 −0.03564 0.03524
Partial opaqueness
1 −0.23070 0.23164 −0.01848 0.01748
2 −0.46284 0.46538 −0.03227 0.03137
4.4 The General Case
Our illustration and our theoretical analysis for opaqueness focused on a two-
period model. The question then arises whether the insights from this two-period
model apply to a general case with T periods. The system of equations in (1) can
easily be extended to more than two periods. The computation of the diﬀerent
26Table 2: Cutoﬀ Betas
Note: This table presents the average cutoﬀ betas of the illus-
tration of the model. β
s
t,i and ¯ β
s
t,i, with t = 1,2 and i = t,o,p
(transparency, opaqueness and partial opaqueness) are the types
of the seller who is indiﬀerent between no order and a CN order,
and a CN and DM order, respectively. β
b
t,i and ¯ β
b
t,i, with t = 1,2
and i = t,o,p are the types of the buyer who is indiﬀerent between














1 0.93651 1 1 1.06349
2 0.94667 0.95346 1.04653 1.05338
Complete Opaqueness
1 0.95032 1 1 1.04968
2 0.95032 1 1 1.04968
Partial Opaqueness
1 0.95026 1 1 1.04974
2 0.94958 0.98897 1.01103 1.05042
27execution probabilities, however, becomes far more complex. Consider the impact
of many trading periods relative to the two-period model for the three diﬀerent
cases. In all cases, the ﬁrst trader assesses the probability that at least one of
the subsequent traders will be a “good” one. With transparency, this probability
is fairly high as the CN order becomes visible and dominates subsequent DM
trades. With complete opaqueness, a CN order also becomes more attractive if
the number of periods increases. The reasoning is that it becomes a dominant
strategy to submit a CN order for at least those traders who would not want to
trade at a DM but may gain from a trade at a CN. This increases the likelihood
that at least one “good” order will arrive, which may even induce some trade
diversion from the DM.
A general analysis, however, becomes quite involved, which is illustrated by
the following example. Suppose that subsequently a CN sell and a CN buy order
have been submitted, and that the CN’s order book cannot be observed. If the
third trader is again a buyer, her CN buy order will not be executed against the
sell order in the CN’s order book since an earlier buy order was submitted. In
determining the expected state of the CN’s order book, she needs to take this
possibility into account in computing her expected execution probability.
To sum up, the system (1) could well be extended to a T-period model.
However, the computation of the execution probabilities immediately becomes
much more complicated in case of complete or partial opaqueness. Nevertheless,
the main insights for our two-period model apply to a more general case.
5 Further Extensions
In this section, we discuss a number of possible extensions of our model. A ﬁrst
extension considers uncertainty in V , the ﬁnal payoﬀ of the asset on day 2. The
analysis presented in Sections 3 and 4 assumed that V is ﬁxed. However, the
arrival of news in between trading periods may render V to vary over time. We
therefore introduce Vt, where the subscript t highlights that V is time varying.
The distribution of these news innovations can be continuous or discrete, and
is known to all traders. In each trading period t, traders and dealers observe
the current value Vt. In line with the analysis in Sections 3 and 4, competition
between dealers forces them to set the ask At and the bid Bt at the ﬁrst possible
28price on the discrete pricing grid, above and below Vt, respectively, implying a
one-tick market. The price of the cross is the midquote at time T, (AT + BT)/2,
which is unknown at t. In contrast, the prices at which the agent can trade in
the DM at time t (At and Bt) are known. Note, however, that in both cases,
traders remain uncertain about the ﬁnal payoﬀ of the asset on day 2. The model
with stochastic Vt can be solved in the same way as before. In Appendix B,
we provide an illustration for the T period model for the transparency case. In
general, the strategies chosen by traders are inﬂuenced by the uncertainty in V
and will depend both on its value at time t, which determines the quoted prices in
the DM at that time, and on the value at T, which is the payoﬀ of the asset and
also determines the price of the cross. Moreover, also the execution probabilities
are inﬂuenced by the uncertainty. The reasoning is that the trader in period
t needs to take into account the behavior of traders arriving in future periods,
whose decisions are also inﬂuenced by the level of V upon their arrival. As a
consequence, the cutoﬀ betas of the model will become more time varying than
without uncertainty. However, these cutoﬀ values can still be computed in the
same way. Therefore, the results and intuitions of Sections 3 and 4 remain valid,
meaning that systematic patterns in order ﬂow are still likely to be observed.
The setup in Sections 3 and 4 assumed a one-tick spread in the DM. However,
competition between dealers and a CN may not always produce a one-tick spread.
Multiple-tick spreads are more likely for stocks where the tick size is small relative
to the value of one share. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) endogenize the
spread in a static model with simultaneous order submissions. In a dynamic
model such as ours, a multiplicity of interactions between DM, CN and traders
arise with potentially multiple-tick spreads. We brieﬂy highlight a number of
issues related to multiple ticks. First, the introduction of multiple-tick spreads
allows dealers to strategically decide on the size of the spread in each period.
Our “transparency” model of Section 3 showed that order submission to the CN
is especially attractive when many periods away from the cross. The reasoning
is that it is quite likely that a “good” counterparty arrives before the cross takes
place. This is less likely when “close” to the cross. The implication is that with
multiple ticks, dealers will tend to narrow their spread in the beginning of the
trading day and widen the spread when close to the cross. As usual, dealers face a
trade-oﬀ in setting a wider spread. On the one hand, they make a larger proﬁt per
29trade executed. On the other hand, since a wider spread also increases the value
of the half spread traders can save by going to the CN, the dealer will attract
less order ﬂow. In our dynamic model, dealers’ current quotes also shape the
dynamics of the future order ﬂow and trades, as a lower current spread decreases
the likelihood that future orders will go to the CN. Second, multiple-tick spreads
might lead to an “asymmetric” spread around the value V , and to “uncertainty”
of the price of the cross. Symmetric changes in the spread (e.g. from a one-tick
around V to a three-tick spread, where both bid and ask are changed by one
tick) do not inﬂuence the price at the cross. There are a number of reasons why
“asymmetric” spreads around V could occur. Dealers might change their quotes
due to inventory reasons. Suppose that in the past a large number of buyers
have bought at the DM. Then the dealer’s inventory position is likely to be low.
Consequently, he will be less willing to sell and more eager to buy to rebuild his
inventory position, to this end increasing his quoted ask and bid price. Important
is that the price of the cross is determined by the quotes of dealers in the ﬁnal
period. Traders need to take into account the incentives faced by dealers in that
ﬁnal period, as it determines the price at which their CN trade will execute. To
avoid manipulation of the price of the cross by dealers, the time of the cross could
be made uncertain, a feature indeed present in many real life crossing networks.
Traders might show heterogeneity in order size. A third possible extension
therefore is the introduction of multiple unit orders. In practice, next to a “regu-
lar” trading venue, CNs can also function as an alternative to an upstairs market
where large orders (blocks) can be executed. Our model could be extended to
include this property. A trader then faces the problem of choosing to submit a
large, multi-unit order either partly or completely to the dealer, or to the CN.
With a ﬁxed spread, submitting large orders to the CN might become less attrac-
tive when already at the long side of the CN book. The reason is that it requires
more future “good” counterparties for the order to be executed. If the dealer can
set quotes for several sizes, also the price impact of an order should be taken into
account by traders.
Our model considers liquidity traders’ choice between a CN or a DM. In
reality, informed trading might take place. Informed trading next to liquidity
trading adds an interesting trade-oﬀ to the model. Informed traders might prefer
to remain anonymous. Crossing networks allow for anonymous trading whereas
30this is more diﬃcult at a dealer market. Informed traders also prefer immediacy
(Easley and O’Hara (1987)). Immediacy is more often guaranteed at a dealer
market. Moreover, informed traders could opt to submit orders to both trading
venues, such that they “exploit” their informational advantage as much as pos-
sible. The impact of informed trading on the interaction between CN and DM
will hinge on the longevity of the informational advantage. When information
becomes public before the next cross, the CN is no longer an option for informed
traders. The reasoning is that the price of the cross will reﬂect this information.
With long-lived information advantages, the trade-oﬀ between immediacy and
anonymity will also shape competition between a CN and a DM.
6 Conclusion
We presented a dynamic microstructure model to study the interaction between
a crossing network (CN) and a dealer market (DM). We compared three diﬀerent
informational environments. A transparency case is contrasted to two opaqueness
settings (complete and partial) which are more in line with actual practice as CNs
often prevent traders from observing order ﬂows. We ﬁnd that the addition of
a CN to a DM setting generates two eﬀects on the composition of order ﬂow.
First, it leads to “order creation” as the CN attracts agents who would refrain
from trading in the absence of a CN. This “order creation” eﬀect is particularly
important with complete opaqueness: these agents always submit a CN order
since they are unaware of an unfavorable imbalance in the CN’s order book.
In contrast, transparency or partial opaqueness might reveal such imbalance.
Second, some orders by relatively low eagerness to trade agents are diverted from
the DM to the CN.
We also show that the execution probability at a CN is endogenous. It de-
pends on the state of the CN’s order book (if transparent), the observed order
ﬂow, and the expectation of past and future orders. Thus, although we start
from dealers willing to provide liquidity at exogenously given bid and ask prices,
we partly endogenize liquidity supply and demand by looking at traders sub-
mitting orders for potential execution at a CN. The transparency and “partial”
opaqueness settings produce systematic patterns in order ﬂow. In particular,
with transparency, we ﬁnd that the probability of observing a CN order at the
31same side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it was not. Also,
the probability of observing a sell at the DM decreases and the probability of a
buyer trading on the DM increases when the previous order was a CN buy.
32Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose ﬁrst that the trader arriving at time t is a
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  βV − (A + B)/2
can be interpreted as follows. If this condition is fulﬁlled, then pb
t
￿  βV − (A + B)/2
￿
≥
  βV − A implying that even for   β the proﬁt of an order to the CN is higher than
the proﬁt of a DM order. In that case, traders always choose to submit a CN
order and the region of β’s for which traders submit DM orders is empty. Fater
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.
The cutoﬀ β’s between submitting an order to the CN and remaining out of
the market are determined by how large the trader’s valuation of the asset is,
relative to its price. The lowest β-type who would CN buy is the one who values
the asset at
(A+B)/2
































Suppose that the trader arriving at time t is a seller. She chooses her strategy
to maximize max[B − βtV,ps

























t is a lower boundon CN selling because in the second case ps
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(A + B)/2 − βV
can be understood as follows. If this conditionis fulﬁlled, then ps
t
￿
(A + B)/2 − βV
￿
≥
B − βV meaning that even for β the proﬁt of an order to the CN is higher than
the proﬁt of a DM trade. In that case, traders will always choose to submit a
CN order and the region of β’s for which traders submit DM orders is empty.

















The cutoﬀ β’s between submitting an order to the CN and remaining out of
the market are determined by how large the trader’s valuation of the asset is,















so we ﬁnd that β
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Proof of Proposition 2. We will prove the proposition in a recursive way
and by contradiction. As a starting point, it can be seen that the proposition
holds for the terminal period T. At time T, the execution probability of a CN
order is either one (if a trader can join the strictly shortest queue in the CN) or
































Suppose now that the proposition is false. Since it is, however, true at T, there
must exist a period τ such that for t > τ, all parts of the proposition hold, but
at τ at least one part does not hold.















































and a CN order when






. In contrast, suppose that the trader would opt




















, the trader submits a CN sell order resulting in the CN’s order book






. The next trader, arriving at time τ + 1, can be either a
buyer or a seller.
case a: A seller arrives at τ + 1.























Moreover, due to time priority at the CN, an order that has been submitted in
τ +1 will only be executed if the previous order in the queue has been executed.























|seller arrives at τ + 1
￿
.


































|seller arrives at τ + 1
￿
≥ B − βτV.
Hence, if the trader at time τ +1 is a seller, the payoﬀ of a CN sell order is higher
when the sell side of the CN’s order book in the crossing network is thinner in
period τ. Hence, it cannot be optimal for a trader to submit a DM order when
the queue at the sell side is shorter.
case b: A buyer arrives at τ + 1.
We know that by assumption (ii) is true at τ + 1. This means that either





























, which results in a CN’s



















. Since (vi) holds at












































Since an order submitted at τ +2 can only be executed if an order submitted at


































|buyer arrives at τ + 1
￿
≥ B − βτV.
36Hence, conditional upon a buyer arriving at time τ + 1, there is a contradiction.
Statement (iv) is therefore true.
A symmetric proof can be constructed for (i). Along the same lines as above,
the other parts of the proposition can be proven.
Proof of Proposition 5. The time t probability of observing a CN buy at


























Suppose that the order imbalance in the CN cb
t − |cs
t| < T − t − 1, such that the
probability of execution of a CN buy is not zero. Then β
b
t+1 (ct+1) is independent
of the CN’s order book. If the order at time t was a CN buy order, then the CN’s













and if the order was a market order (buy or sell) the CN’s
































Since F (.) is monotonically nondecreasing in β, the result follows.
Suppose now that cb
t − |cs
t| ≥ T − t − 1, this means that either no CN orders
are submitted, in which case the proposition holds trivially, or at time t the









= A/V , hence the result follows since also β
b
t+1 (ct+1) = A/V .
A similar proof can be constructed for CN sell orders.
Proof of Proposition 6. The time t probability of observing a CN buy at


























is ﬁxed and independent of the CN’s order book. If the order at time t













and if the order was a
37market order (buy or sell) the CN’s order book does not change: ct = ct+1. From
































Since F (.) is monotonically nondecreasing in β, the result follows.
A similar proof can be constructed for CN sell orders.
38Appendix B: Uncertainty
In this appendix, we introduce uncertainty into the model by making V a sto-
chastic variable Vt which varies over time. More speciﬁcally, we assume that Vt
follows a random walk:12
Vt = Vt−1 + εt
where εt is identically and independently distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2
ε. Its distribution can be continuous, e.g. the normal distribution, or discrete
and is known to all traders. The noise variable can be interpreted as the occur-
rence of a news shock in the market in between periods during the trading day.
These shocks inﬂuence the underlying value of the asset. In each period t, traders
and dealers observe the current value Vt. As the value of the asset changes over
time, dealers are allowed to adjust their quotes. More speciﬁcally, before the
trader at t arrives, dealers set their bid and ask prices around Vt. Competition
is assumed to be harsh such that they set the ask At and the bid Bt at the ﬁrst
possible price on the discrete pricing grid, respectively above and below Vt. In
this way, we retain a one-tick market. Note that this assumption also implies
that quotes in future periods will remain at their current levels as long as future
values of V remain between At and Bt. Dealer prices only change when V exceeds
the ask in the previous period or falls below the previous bid.
Traders condition their optimal strategies on a number of variables. Some of
these variables are, as in our baseline model, known with certainty. In particular,
we assume that the trader arriving at time t observes the state of the order
book in the CN ct (so we assume transparency), the time left until the cross
T −t, the proportions of buyers and sellers πb and πs and her type βt, as well as
the overall distribution of β. She also observes Vt, the current realization of the
value of the asset, and the resulting dealer market quotes At and Bt. However,
she is uncertain about the ﬁnal value of the asset VT and the resulting price of
the cross (AT + BT)/2. Therefore, relying on her knowledge of the underlying
stochastic process of V , she needs to determine expected values for these variables.
Consequently, her submission strategy will depend on these expectations.
12This is without loss of generality. Our methodology can be easiliy adapted for alternative
assumptions on the data generating process of Vt.
39Suppose that the trader that arrives at time t is a buyer. The expected proﬁt







= βtEt (VT) − At
where Et denotes the expectations operator, based on the information set at time
t.


















As possible execution of this order only occurs at the end of the trading day, she
needs to form expectations on VT and the associated price of the cross. Note
that the latter is in contrast with a DM buy order, where the trader is uncertain
about the value VT but knows the current buy price At. Due to the random
walk assumption for Vt, it holds that all expectations equal the current values.
Hence, Et (VT) = Vt and Et ((AT + BT)/2) = (At + Bt)/2. Given that she knows
the distributions of εt and βt, as well as the state of the order book ct and the
remaining number of periods T − t, she can compute the expected execution
probability of a CN buy order, pb
t. If she is able to join the shortest queue pb
t
reaches unity. Otherwise pb
t equals the probability that enough traders that are
willing to join the market’s sell side queue will arrive, hence counterbalancing the
imbalance that would be created by her order.
The proﬁt of submitting no order remains zero.
The cutoﬀ values for βt at which traders are indiﬀerent between two strate-
gies could be calculated as in Section 3.3.13 A buyer at t is indiﬀerent between




















￿,   β
￿
.
13As our traders are considered to be risk neutral, they are indiﬀerent between two strategies
yielding the same expected proﬁt.

















Deriving the seller’s cutoﬀ values is completely symmetric. Comparing these
values with the ones found in Section 3.3, at ﬁrst sight they appear to be very
similar. However, some important diﬀerences do exist.
First, as traders are uncertain about the ﬁnal underlying asset value VT, the
cutoﬀ betas now depend on their expectation of this value and of the resulting
surrounding quotes. Due to our random walk assumption, these forecasts equal
the current value of the variables (i.e. Vt, At and Bt), implying that current
variable levels will determine traders’ expected proﬁts and hence their trading
strategy. Therefore, if news arrives in the market altering the underlying value
of the asset, the expectation for VT (and depending on the position in the pricing
grid possibly for AT and BT) will also vary. Consequently, as compared to our
baseline model, the cutoﬀ betas are more dynamic and also depend on the current
state of the market.14 Moreover, note that if Vt changes, but remains between the
previous bid and ask prices (such that these do not change), this will still aﬀect
the order submission strategy of the trader since the ratio of the (expected) price
of the cross and the (expected) value of the asset changes.
Secondly, as discussed above, introducing uncertainty in the model also has
repercussions for the computation of the probability of execution, pb
t. As in our
baseline model, to determine pb
t trader t will account for the behavior of traders
arriving in future periods. However, these traders’ decisions will now also be
inﬂuenced by the level of V at that point in time. The current trader takes this
eﬀect into account while determining her submission strategy.
To sum up, we have shown that it is possible to calculate cutoﬀ values which
appear to be similar to those in our baseline model. Based on these values, a graph
comparable to Figure 3 could be drawn. However, now traders’ strategies also
reﬂect uncertainty on future values of V. Nevertheless, it is clear that even with
14This is obviously the case for ¯ β
b
t, and it is even more apparent for β
b
t. In the baseline model,
β
b
t is in general equal to a ﬁxed number ((A + B)/2/V ), and only changes to A/V when the
execution probability of a CN buy order becomes zero. In our extended model, β
b
t changes
every period (unless Vt = Vt−1).
41these new cutoﬀ values and the resulting strategies, propositions 3 to 6 remain
valid. Hence, systematic patterns in order ﬂow are still likely to be observed. In
other words, ourempirical predictions in Section 3.4 are robust to the introduction
of uncertainty in the underlying value of the asset.
42References
Biais, B., L. Glosten, C. Spatt, 2002, The Microstructure of Stock Markets, CEPR
Discussion Paper 3288.
Chakravarty, S., C. Holden, 1995, An Integrated Model Of Market And Limit
Orders, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 4, pp. 213-241.
Chemmanur, T., P Fulghieri, 2003, Competition and Co-operation Among Ex-
changes: a Theory of Cross Listing and Endogenous Listing Standards, Working
Paper.
Conrad, J., K. Johnson, S. Wahal, 2003, Institutional Trading and Alternative
Trading Systems, Journal of Financial Economics, 70, pp. 99-134.
Di Noia, C., 2001, Competition and Integration Among Stock Exchanges in Eu-
rope: Network Eﬀects, Implicit Mergers and Remote Access, European Financial
Management, 7, pp. 39-72.
Dönges, J., F. Heinemann, 2001, Competition for Order Flow as a Coordination
Game, Working Paper.
Easley, D., M. O’Hara, 1987, Price, Trade Size, and Information in Securities
Markets, 19, Journal of Financial Economics, 19, pp. 69-90.
Fong, K., A. Madhavan, P. Swang, 2004, Are Upstairs Markets Pareto Improv-
ing?, School of Banking and Finance, University of New South Wales Working
Paper.
Foucault, T., 1999, Order Flow Composition and Trading Costs in a Dynamic
Limit Order Market, Journal of Financial Markets, 2, pp. 99-134.
Foucault, T., C. Parlour, 2001, Competition for Listings, forthcoming in RAND
Journal of Economics.
Foucault, T., O. Kadan, E. Kandel, 2003, Limit Order Book as a Market for
Liquidity, forthcoming in Review of Financial Studies.
Glosten, L., 1994, Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?, Journal
of Finance, 49, pp. 1127-1161.
43Glosten, L., 1998, Precedence Rules, Columbia University Working Paper.
Goettler, R., Parlour, C., Rajan, U., 2004, Equilibrium in a Dynamic Limit Order
Market, forthcoming in Journal of Finance.
Gresse, C., 2002, Crossing Network Trading and the Liquidity of a Dealer Market:
Cream Skimming or Risk Sharing?, Working Paper.
Hendershott, T., H. Mendelson, 2000, Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets:
Competition and Performance, Journal of Finance, 55, pp. 2071-2115.
Huang, R., 2002, The Quality of ECN and NASDAQ Market Maker Quotes,
Journal of Finance, 57, pp. 1285-1319.
Næ s, R., B. Ødegaard, 2004, Equity Trading by Institutional Investors. To Cross
or Not to Cross?, Working Paper.
Parlour, C., 1998, Price Dynamics in Limit Order Markets, Review of Financial
Studies, 11, pp. 789-816.
Parlour, C., D. Seppi, 2003, Liquidity-Based Competition for Order Flow, Review
of Financial Studies, 16, pp. 301-343.
Rock, K., 1996, The Specialist’s Order Book and Price Anomalies, Working Pa-
per.
Rosu, I., 2004, A Dynamic Model of the Limit Order Book, M.I.T. Working
Paper.
Santos, T., J. Scheinkman, 2001, Competition Among Exchanges, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 116, pp. 1027-1061.
Securities and Exchange Commission, 1998, Regulation of Exchanges and Alter-
native Trading Systems, Release Number 34-40760, 8 December.
Seppi, D., 1997, Liquidity Provision with Limit Orders and a Strategic Specialist,
Review of Financial Studies, 10, pp. 103-150.
Shy, O., J. Tarkka, 2001, Stock Exchanges Alliances, Access Fees and Competi-
tion, Bank of Finland DP 22/2001.
44Viswanathan, S., J. Wang, 2002, Market Architecture: Limit-Order Books versus
Dealership Markets, Journal of Financial Markets, 5, pp. 127-167.
45